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ABSTRACT
This research aims to analyze and obtain empirical evidence 
about the influence of fraud diamond (pressure, opportunity, 
rationalization, and capability) on fraudulent financial reporting 
in the public sector. Opinion on the financial statements of the 
district / municipal government in Indonesia is used as a proxy to 
indicate fraudulent financial reporting. The population used in 
this research is the district / municipal governments in Indonesia. 
The total samples are 437 district / municipal governments 
obtained through convenience sampling method. This research 
uses secondary data drawn from BPK’s Audit Reports of 2014 
and 2015 and BPK’s Audit Results Summary of the First Semester 
(IHPS) of 2015. To analyze the data, this research uses logistic 
regression analysis with the SPSS 20.0 software tools. The 
results show that the factor of pressure, ie financial target that is 
proxied by percentage of budget realization has negative effect 
on fraudulent financial reporting; the factor of opportunity, ie 
related party transaction that is proxied by income transfers 
from the central government and internal control weakness that 
is proxied by audit findings of internal control systems in BPK’s 
Audit Result Reports has positive effect on fraudulent financial 
reporting, ie the factor of capability that is proxied by changes 
of regent / mayor has positive effect on fraudulent financial 
reporting, while the factor of pressure, ie external pressure that 
is proxied by local government capability of paying its liabilities 
(leverage) and the factor of rationalization that is proxied by 
previous year non-unqualified opinion has no significant effect 
on fraudulent financial reporting.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Global economic order can never escape 
from a threat, called fraud. Any organization 
or entity should be wary of the threat. This is 
in line with the statement of the Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE, 2014) 
“Fraud is ubiquitous. It does not discriminate in 
its occurrence”. No organization or entity has 
immunity to this threat. Various cases of fraud 
have become the headlines of both local and 
international media. The case is indiscriminate 
and may occur in either poor countries, 
developing countries, or developed countries. 
Several cases of fraud are most frequently 
reported to occur in private, particularly in 
financial and banking, sector. However, there 
are also some reports related to fraud occurring 
in government sector. This is quite ironic, 
because the government is supposed to be 
a tool for a country in enforcing the law and 
regulations, but some elements therein, in fact, 
commit fraud.
Stakeholders (the people and the legislature) 
always demand for accountability and 
transparency in state financial management by 
both central and local government. And these 
interests can be accommodated through good 
governance. Based on agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), agency conflict or conflict 
of interest can occur between the legislature 
(principal) and the government (agent). These 
differences in interests, in turn, will lead to 
agency problems, one of which is fraud. To 
ensure that the government acts in accordance 
with the interests of the people / the legislature 
requires independent and professional external 
auditors, namely the Supreme Audit Board 
of the Republic of Indonesia (hereinafter 
referred to as Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or 
BPK).
BPK’s audit results of the local government 
financial statements, budget year 2014, 
reveal that 251 local government financial 
statements receive unqualified opinion, 230 
local government financial statements receive 
qualified opinion, 44 local government 
financial statements receive adversed opinion, 
and 19 local government financial statements 
receive disclaimer of opinion. The audit 
result, in the form of opinion, is obtained 
from a reasonable assurance that the financial 
statement is free of material misstatements. 
The local government financial statements that 
receive audit opinion other than unqualified 
opinion (non-unqualified opinion) generally 
have weaknesses or irregularities in their 
financial reporting based on the government 
accounting standards, one of them is in the 
form of material misstatement. The deliberate 
act causing material misstatement in the 
financial statements is a form of fraud. This is 
in accordance with the Statement of Auditing 
Standards (PSA) No. 70 (SA Section 316) 
“accounting fraud is a misstatement arising 
from fraudulent financial reporting”. Thus, the 
audit opinions other than unqualified opinion 
(non-unqualified opinion) contain elements of 
fraud which, according to the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE), is called 
fraudulent statements / fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Fraudulent financial reporting can be 
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explained through Cressey’s fraud triangle 
(1953), in Lou and Wang (2009), consisting 
of: 1) pressure / motive; 2) opportunity; and 3) 
attitude / rationalization. Wolfe and Hermanson 
(2004) add capability as a qualitative factor and 
as the complement of Cressey’s fraud triangle 
model. This research is the development of 
the research conducted by Luqi Santo Timor 
Andriana (2015) on the factors of fraud in the 
financial statements of local governments in 
Indonesia. The difference is in the addition of 
the proxy of the variable of pressure, ie budget 
realization, and the proxy of the variable of 
opportunity, ie the internal control weakness.
Based on the background described above, 
the research question is: Do the factors of 
pressure, opportunity, attitude, and capability 
have an effect on fraudulent financial 
statements of district / municipal governments 
in Indonesia?
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Agency Theory
Theory of the relationship between 
principal and agent has been warmly discussed 
by academics-practitioners in the field of social 
sciences and economics since the 1970s. Ross 
and Mitnick claim that they are the first who 
issue “The Theory of Agency”. However, the 
most frequently cited reference regarding the 
“Agency Theory” is derived from the statement 
of Jensen and Meckling.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an 
agency relationship as a contract in which one 
person or more (as the principal) bind to another 
person (as the agent) to carry out activities on 
behalf of the principal, and the principal gives 
the agent some authorities to take decision. In 
the agency relationship, each of the parties is 
likely to maximize its own utility and the agent 
does not always act in accordance with the 
wishes of the principal. Therefore, the principal 
can limit the agency problem / conflict of 
interest by spending agency cost. Agency 
problem occurs at any levels of organization, 
any levels of management, universities, 
corporations, various forms of cooperation, and 
also government.
Local Finances
Local finances, such as local revenue, local 
spending, and local equity, are parts of the state 
finance as stipulated in Law No. 17 of 2003 on 
State Finance. The local financial management 
itself is set in Government Regulation (PP) 
No. 58 of 2005, which states that local finance 
is the local right and obligation to maintain 
the local government that can be valued in 
money including all forms of wealth relating 
to local rights and obligations of the area. The 
local financial management is all activities 
that include planning, implementation, 
administration, reporting, accountability, and 
oversight of local finances.
Government Internal Control System
Internal control system consists of policies, 
practices and procedures used by a company 
to achieve its four general objectives, namely: 
securing corporate assets, ensuring the 
accuracy and reliability of the various records 
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and accounting information, disseminating 
efficiency in the company’s operations, and 
measuring compliance with policies and 
procedures established by management (Hall 
and Singleton, 2009).
The Government Regulation No. 60 of 
2008 on the Government Internal Control 
System states: “Internal control system is an 
integrated process of actions and activities 
carried out continuously by the management 
and all employees to provide reasonable 
assurance on the achievement of organizational 
objectives through effective and efficient 
activities, reliable financial reporting, security 
of state assets, and compliance with laws and 
regulations.
Fraud
According to the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE), fraud is an act 
against the law done intentionally for a specific 
purpose (manipulating or giving false reports 
to the other party). The act is done by people 
from inside or outside the organization for 
personal or group’s interests that are directly 
or indirectly harmful to other parties. ACFE 
divides fraud within three (3) types or typology 
of works, namely: asset misappropriation, 
fraudulent financial statements, and corruption.
Fraud Diamond Theory
Cressey (1953), in Wells (2001), explains 
that people who commit fraud are driven by 
three factors: pressure, perceived opportunity, 
and rationalization. According to Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004,) Cressey’s fraud triangle 
theory can be perfected to improve prevention 
and detection of fraud by adding the fourth 
element, that is, capability.
Hypothesis Development
Cons with previous studies that took the 
research object of private sector, the authors 
try to direct this research object to the public 
sector. The authors try to replicate the previous 
research by adjusting and reducing the existing 
proxies in the previous studies, because not all 
proxies are suitable if they are drawn into the 
public sector. Based on the theoretical basis 
and the previous studies, it can be arranged 
a systematic framework that describes the 
variable of fraudulent financial reporting in the 
public sector.
Pressure: Local Government’s Capability 
of Meeting the Liabilities 
(Leverage) and Achieving the 
Budget Realization Target
One of the external pressures is leverage 
(Skousen, 2004). According to Mustafa (2003), 
the companies that experience fraudulent action 
have the higher number of liabilities than those 
that do not. Thus, in this research, pressure 
is measured using the capability of district / 
municipal governments to pay the liabilities 
(leverage).
Government budget absorption is almost 
the same as the financial target on the private 
sector in terms of percentage of achievement 
that should be close to the target that has been 
set. However, the fundamental differences 
in the objectives of the organization, either 
profit-oriented or non-profit oriented, bring 
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significant differences. In private sector, 
fraud is generally done by way of overstating 
the income or understating the cost. If the 
company’s real income is small, this shows the 
negative effect of financial target on fraudulent 
financial reporting. Companies that perform 
fraudulent financial reporting are indicated that 
the achievement of their real financial target 
(profitability) is low (Spathis, 2002). For the 
public sector in Indonesia, since its financial 
target is the realization of the budget, the fraud 
is generally performed by way of overstating 
the expenditures, such as fictitious spending 
and overpayments, whereas the number of real 
expenditure is low. Thus, in this study, pressure 
is measured by the realization of the budget.
Based on the descriptions above, the 
research hypothesis can be formulated as 
follows:
H1a: The local government’s capability of 
paying the liabilities (leverage) has 
positive influence on fraudulent financial 
reporting
H1b: Budget expenditure absorption has 
negative influence on fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Opportunity: Related Party Transaction 
(Income Transfer from Central 
Government to Local Government) 
and the Weakness of Internal Control 
System
Related party transaction that involves 
the outside parties of the entity tends to 
be accompanied by a high inherent risk 
because it is usually accompanied by higher 
accountability requirements. Management 
tends to manipulate the use and the related 
party transaction reporting. Lou and Wang 
(2009) conclude that when there are many 
complicated transactions, such as transactions 
arising from complex financial schemes and 
related party transactions, the company will 
likely experience the fraud.
Research conducted by KPMG (2008) 
shows that the main factor that leads to fraud is 
a weak control system. This is consistent with 
KPMG’s previous studies since 1993. In line 
with the study by KPMG, ACFE (2014) also 
finds that the weakness of the control system 
is the most common factor that contributes to 
fraud. According to Bell and Carcello (2000), 
one of the determinants of fraud is a weak 
internal control environment. Thus, the finding 
of the weakness of the internal control system 
is used to measure the opportunity.
Based on these descriptions, the research 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows.
H2a: Income transfer has positive influence on 
fraudulent financial reporting.
H2b: The weakness of internal control system 
has positive influence on fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Rationalization:  The previous years’ finan-
cial statements that re-
ceive audit opinions other 
than unqualified opinion 
(non-unqualified opinion) 
Francis and Krishnan (1999) and Skousen 
and Wright (2006) state that the management’s 
decision making process in achieving profit 
targets, outputs, and outcome opens the road 
towards the encouragement or understanding 
of management, which might lead to the 
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rationalization to commit fraud in financial 
reporting. Rationalization of fraudulent 
financial statements is measured with the audit 
opinions obtained by the local government 
financial statements for the last 2 years which is 
other than unqualified opinion (non-unqualified 
opinion. The reason for the local government to 
perform fraudulent financial reporting is that it 
has occurred since the past, and then it becomes 
a rationalization / justification
Based on these descriptions, the hypothesis 
can be formulated as follows:
H3: Non - Unqualified Opinion on the 
previous year’s financial statements has 
positive influence on fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Capability: Changes in Local Government 
Head (Regent / Mayor)
Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson (1999) 
find that 83% of financial fraud involves the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and / or the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO). In line with this, Wolfe 
and Hermanson (2004) conduct a study with a 
focus on fraud risk factors, especially the factor 
of capability which becomes the background 
of the occurrence of fraud. The study finds 
that the changes in board of directors have an 
“indication” of fraud. Substitution of board 
of directors is part of the company’s effort to 
improve the company performance doe to less 
efficient and effective policies of the previous 
director. The substitution of directors also 
indicates an effort of the company to eliminate 
the directors who are deemed to know fraud 
occurring in the company.
Carcello (2009) states that the financial 
statement containing material misstatement 
often occurs as a result of deliberate action of the 
senior managers (CEO and / or CFO) to misstate 
the financial results, or the management makes 
mistakes in preparing financial statement. 
The substitution of directors in the public 
sector (local government) is the same as the 
substitution of executives (Regional Head).
H4: Changes in Local Government Head have 
positive influence on fraudulent financial 
reporting.
33Asia Pasific Fraud JournalVolume 2, No.1st Edition (January-June 2017) 
Indra K, Halim Dedy P, Sri Suranta : Fraudulent financial reporting by district/municipal .....
Page 27-48
Research Method
The population used in this study is all 
district / municipal governments in Indonesia 
in 2014. The research samples are obtained 
using a convenience sampling method in which 
the data are obtained from the samples which 
are most readily available, such as BPK’s 
Audit Reports of 2014 and BPK’s Audit Report 
Summary of the First Semester of 2015, with 
the criteria of the entities that are required to 
prepare financial statements in 2013 and 2104, 
and the data of the sample that can be obtained.
This study uses secondary data, with 
the reason that the data have had validity 
guaranteed by other parties so as to be reliable 
for the research. The data collection method 
used in this study is documentation method, in 
which the data collection is done by studying 
the company’s records or documents in 
accordance with the data needed. The data used 
are the local government financial statements 
fiscal year 2013 and 2014 taken from the BPK’s 
Audit Reports of 2014 and BPK’s Audit Report 
Summary of the First Semester of 2015.
This study uses two main variables, namely 
independent variables and dependent variable, 
and control variable. The independent variable 
in this study is the factors of fraud according to 
Diamond Fraud (Fraud Triangle + Capability) 
developed from the research of Skousen et 
al. (2008), Kennedy Samuel Sihombing and 
Rahardjo (2014) and Luqi Santo Timor Andriana 
 
       
       
      H1b(+)  
      H1b(-) 
      H2a(+)  Dependent Variable 
      H2b(+) 
       
      H3(+) 
 
      H4(+) 








Internal Pressure (LG’s ability 
to pay the obligations) 
Financial Target (Budget 
absorption) 
Opportunity 
Special Party Transaction 
(transfer from central 
government) 
The weaknesses of internal 
control system  
Rationalization 
Prior Fraud  
(Non - unqualified opinion in the 
last 2 years) 
Capability 
Changes of Regional Head 
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(Total assets) 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Non - unqualified opinion. 
34 Asia Pasific Fraud JournalVolume 2, No.1st Edition (January-June 2017)
Indra K, Halim Dedy P, Sri Suranta : Fraudulent financial reporting by district/municipal .....
Page 27-48
(2015), namely: a) external pressure which 
is proxied by the ratio of local governments’ 
capability of paying liabilities (LEVERAGE) 
and the percentage of budget absorption 
(REALEXP); b) opportunity which is proxied 
by related party transactions, ie between local 
government and central government from the 
total income transfer (LNTRANS) and internal 
control weaknesses (ICW); c) rationalization 
which is proxied by non-unqualified opinion 
obtained for the last two years (PRIOROP); 
d) capability which is proxied by the changes 
in Regional Head (CHKD). The dependent 
variable in this study is fraudulent financial 
reporting in district / municipal governments in 
Indonesia which is proxied by the opinion of 
BPK’s Audit Reports (FFR). Measurement of 
fraudulent financial reporting is conducted using 
the dummy, where the score 1 shows that local 
government is suspected to perform fraudulent 
financial reporting with opinion other than 
Unqualified Opinion (non-unqualified opinion) 
and the score 0 is for the local governments 
that do not perform fraudulent financial 
reporting (Kurniawan Dwi Haryanto 2011 and 
Luqi Santo Timor Andriana, 2015). This study 
uses the size of the local government which is 
seen from the value of total assets (LNASET) 
transformed through a process of logarithms 
as the control variable in testing the influence 
of several proxy variables of the factors of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
Statistical analysis tool used in this study 
is software SPSS 20.0. In searching for the 
relationship between the variables in this study, 
the researchers use logistic regression analysis, 
because the data used in this study are non metric 
(dummy) on the dependent variable (FFR), 
while the independent variables (LEVERAGE, 
REALEXP, LNTRANS, ICW, PRIOROP, 
and CHKD) are a hybrid between continuous 
variables (metric data) and categorical (non-
metric data). Logistic regression analysis does 
not require the data normality assumption and 
does not need to prove classical assumptions 
such as multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and 
heteroscedasticity (Imam Ghozali, 2013).
The logit models used in this study can be 
described as follows:
FFR = β0 + β1LEVERAGE + β2REALEXP+ β3LNTRANS  +  β4 ICW +  β5 CHOP + β6 
CHKD+ ε
Description:
FFR : Dummy variable by encoding:
- “1” for Opinion other than  Unqualified Opinion, as an indication that there 
is fraud
- “0” for Unqualified Opinion
LEVERAGE : The ratio of total liabilities to total assets
REALEXP : The percentage of budget absorption
LNTRANS : The amount of income from transfer (log natural (Ln))
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ICW : Dummy variable, code 1 is when there is a weakness in internal control 
system, and code 0 is when there is no..
PRIOROP : Dummy variable, code 1 is when the local government receives Unqualified 
Opinion in the last 2 years, code 2 is when the local government got audit 
opinion other than Unqualified Opinion for the last 2 years, and code 0 is 
when the local government did not get.
CHKD : Dummy variable, code 1 is when there is LG head substitution in the last two 
years, code 0 is when there is no LG head.
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Description of the Data
This study uses secondary data from Local 
Government Financial Statements of 2013 
and 2014 that have been audited by BPK, and 
data of BPK’s Audit Report Summary of the 
First Semester of 2015. The population in this 
study is all district / municipal governments 
in Indonesia, as many as 505 entities that 
are required to prepare financial statements. 
The sampling process is done by using a 
convenience sampling method.
Of the 505 reporting entities, the researchers 
can obtain a sample of 430 observations. Three 
data / observations are indicated as outliers 
(*residual case wise diagnostics, outliers 
outside “2” standard deviations”) because the 
data deviate too far from the other data (extreme 
data). The variables that have extreme values 
can distort the regression coefficient estimates. 
Therefore, the extreme-value data (outlier) 
need to be excluded from the research data with 
case wise diagnostics so that the observations, 
that become the final sample, are as many as 
427 district / municipal governments.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics test in this study 
aims to provide a general overview of the 
characteristics of the research variables that 
include the number of observations (N), the 
mean value, the maximum value, the minimum 
value, and the standard deviation value which 
describe the propagation of data.
Table1
Descriptive Statistics
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
FFR 427 0 1 0.5363 0.4993
LEVERAGE 427 0.0000 0.0796 0.0079 0.0118
REALEXP 427 67.0000 98.6500 87.9794 5.1838
LNTRANS 427 26.5982 29.3911 27.5458 0.4699
ICWCASE 427 1 32 11.0820 4.9267
PRIOROP 427 0 1 0.7377 0.4404
CHKD 427 0 1 0.2740 0.4465
LNASET 427 27.1880 31.2844 28.5026 0.6449
Source: Processed Secondary Data
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The results of descriptive statistics in Table 
1 show that the number of samples in the study 
is 427 observations. The variable of fraudulent 
financial reporting (FFR) is a dummy variable 
that has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum 
value of 1 with a mean value of 0.5363. This 
indicates that as many as 53.63% or 229 district 
/ municipal governments get unqualified 
opinion, while the remaining 51.46% or 198 
district / municipal governments get audit 
opinion other than unqualified opinion (non-
unqualified opinion) indicating that they 
perform fraudulent financial reporting.
The variable of government’s capability 
of paying liabilities (LEVERAGE) has a 
minimum value of 0.0000 and a maximum 
value of 0.0796 with a mean value of 0.0079. 
This shows that the average ratio of obligation 
to the district / municipal government’s assets 
is small, or below 1%. The smaller the leverage 
ratio, the smaller the obligation of the district / 
municipal government, and the smaller the risk 
of failure to restore the obligations.
The variable of budget expenditure 
realization (REALEXP) has a minimum value 
of 67.0000 and a maximum value of 98.6500 
with a mean value of 87.9794. It shows 
that the expenditure realization of district / 
municipal government has a minimum value of 
67.00% and a maximum value of 98.65%. The 
expenditure realization of district / municipal 
government has the mean value of 87.98%, 
which means that the district / municipal 
government attempts to achieve the budget 
realization target of 100%.
The variable of Income Transfer 
(LNTRANS) which is measured by the natural 
log (ln) has a minimum value of 26.5982 and a 
maximum value of 29.3911 with a mean value of 
27.5458. Subulussalam municipal government 
obtains the smallest income transfer, or as much 
as IDR 355,995,386,095.24, conversely Kutai 
district government obtains the biggest income 
transfer as much as 5,813,145,104,038.00. The 
amount of income transfer is expected to help 
achieving the goals of the nation and state, 
among other things is to encourage economic 
growth in the area.
The variable of previous year opinion 
(PRIOROP) has a minimum value of 0 and 
a maximum value of 1 with a mean value 
of 0.7377. This indicates that 26.23% or as 
many as 112 district / municipal governments 
get unqualified opinion in the last 2 years, 
while the remaining 73.77% or 315 district / 
municipal governments get audit opinion other 
than unqualified opinion in the last 2 years.
The variable of Changes in Regional 
Head (CHKD) has a minimum value of 0 
and a maximum value of 1 with a mean value 
of 0.2740. This indicates that 27.40% or as 
many as 117 district / municipal governments 
experience regional head substitution in the 
last 2 years, while the remaining 72.6% or 
310 district / municipal governments do not 
experience regional head substitution in the last 
2 years.
The variable of Total Assets which is measured 
by the log natural (ln) has a minimum value of 
27.1880 and a maximum value of 31.2844 with 
a mean value of 28.5026. Pulau Morotai district 
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government has the smallest total assets, or 
IDR 642,093,117,216.92, conversely Surabaya 
municipal government has the biggest total 
assets, or 38,605,937,665,339.50. The district 
/ municipal governments that have great assets 
are the long-standing areas and tend not as the 
result of the expansion and identical to the big 
city.
Hypothesis Test




Block -2 Log likelihood
0 589.695
1 316.606
Source: Processed Secondary Data
Based on table 2, it can be seen that the 
value -2 Log Likelihood in Block 0, where 
the model only includes constants without 
independent variable, is 589.695. Meanwhile, 
the value -2 Log Likelihood in Block 1, where 
the model includes constants and independent 
variables in the iteration history table, downs to 
316.606. The value -2 Log Likelihood in Block 
0 > -2 Log Likelihood in block 1 means that 
the model is said to be getting better, or in other 
words, the addition of independent variables in 
the model is able to repair the model. So it can 
be said that the regression model in this study 
already fits or according to the data.
Nagelkerke R2 Test
Table 3
Nagelkerke R2 Test 
Step -2 Log likelihood




1 316.606a 0.472 0.631
Source: Processed Secondary Data
As described in the previous chapter, the 
value of Nagelkerke R2 in logistic regression 
can be equated to the value of R2 in the 
multiple linear regression to show how much 
the determination coefficient. Based on Table 
3, the value of Nagelkerke R2 is 0.631 which 
means that the independent variables are able 
to explain the dependent variable of 63.1% 
and the remaining 36.9% is explained by other 
variables outside the model.
Hosmer and LemeshowGoodness of fit Test
Table 4
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 9.190 8 0.327
Source: Processed Secondary Data
Based on Table 4, it can be seen that Hosmer 
and Lemeshow Goodness of fit test produces 
chi-square value of 9.190 with a significance 
value of 0.327. The significance value is greater 
than α = 0.10, which means that the model is 
able to predict its observation value or it can be 
said that the model is acceptable because it fits 
the observation data.
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Accuracy Test of Model Classification
Table 5
Accuracy Test of Model Classification
Observed
FFR





Step 1 FFR There is no Fraud 130 68 65,7
There is Fraud 22 207 90,4
Overall Percentage   78,9
Source: Processed Secondary Data 
Table 5 above shows that according to 
predictions, the number of district / municipal 
governments that do not perform fraudulent 
financial reporting are 198, while according 
to the observation result the number is only 
130, so the classification accuracy is 65.7% 
(130/198). According to the further predictions, 
the number of district / municipal governments 
that perform fraudulent financial reporting is 
229, while according to the observation result 
the number is only 207, so the classification 
accuracy is 90.4% (207/229). Based on the two 
prediction results, in overall, the classification 
accuracy is 78.9%, in which the value is more 
than or equal to 50%, which means that this 
model has good prediction ability.
Simultaneous Significance Test
Table 6
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
 Chi-square df Sig.
Step 
1
Step 273,089 7 0,000
Block 273,089 7 0,000
Model 273,089 7 0,000
Source: Processed Secondary Data 
The test results in table 6 show that the 
chi-square value of 273.089 is the difference 
between block 0 and block 1, while the value 
of chi square table with df: 7 with α: 0.10 is 
12.017. The value of chi square count / statistics 
is greater than the value of chi square table, and 
the significance value of 0.000 is smaller than 
0.10 indicating that the independent variables 
simultaneously affect the dependent variable.
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Individual Parameters Significance Test
Table 7
Variables in the Equation
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 1a
LEVERAGE -8.772
        
10.585 
        
0.687 
1         0.407 0.000
REALEXP -0.078
          
0.031 
        
6.483 
1         0.011* 0.925
LNTRANS 1.217
          
0.571 
        
4.535 
1         0.033* 3.376
ICWCASE 0.199
          
0.038 
      
27.989 
1         0.000* 1.220
PRIOROP(1) -22.267   3,616.253 
        
0.000 
1         0.995 0.000
CHKD(1) -0.533
          
0.318 
        
2.801 




          
0.446 
        
4.336 
1         0.037* 0.395
Constant -0.856           
9.038 
        
0.009 
1         0.925 0.425
*Significance α = 5%
**Significance α = 10%
Source: Processed Secondary Data
The test results in Table 7 show that the 
variable of the ratio of local governments’ 
capability of paying liabilities (LEVERAGE) 
and the variable of financial statement audit 
opinions other than Unqualified Opinion 
(non-unqualified opinion in the previous year 
(PRIOROP) have significance values above α 
= 10%, which means that these variables do 
not affect the variable of fraudulent financial 
reporting (FFR). Instead, the variable of 
budget expenditure realization (REALEXP), 
the variable of related transaction / income 
transfer (LNTRANS), the variable of internal 
control weaknesses (ICWCASE), the variable 
of changes in regional head (CHKD) and 
the variable of total assets (LNASET) have 
significance values below α = 10%, meaning 
that these variables affect the variable of 
fraudulent financial reporting (FFR). But 
since the variable of changes in regional 
head (CHKD) has a negative direction, it is 
not consistent with the hypothesis. Thus, the 
variables that affect the dependent variable and 
in line with the direction of the relationship 
in the hypothesis are the variable of budget 
expenditure realization (REALEXP), the 
variable of income transfer (LNTRANS), and 
the variable of internal control weaknesses 
(ICWCASE).
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DISCUSSION
The factor of pressure in fraudulent financial 
reporting (H1)
The local government’s capability of paying 
its liabilities (leverage) in fraudulent financial 
reporting (H1a)
Individual parameter significance test 
results in Table 7 show that the wald value of 
the variable of local government’s capability 
of meeting its liabilities (LEVERAGE) is 
-8.772 with a significance value of 0.407. The 
significance value which is greater than 0.10 
means that H1a is rejected, so it can be said 
that the variable of leverage has no positive 
effect on fraudulent financial reporting.
Liabilities are debts arising from the past 
event in which its settlement results in the 
outflow of government’s economic resources. 
The liabilities of district / municipal government 
in general arise from transaction debts of local 
government working unit (hereinafter referred 
to as SKPD) and transaction debts of local 
public service agencies (hereinafter referred to 
as BLUD). Since SKPD and BLUD are part of 
the reporting entity of the district / municipal 
government, the pressure perceived by the 
district / municipal government is minimal. 
However, if the liabilities are derived from debt 
agencies, which usually require detailed debt 
management accountability, the government 
could perform fraudulent financial reporting as 
a result of the pressure for the accountability.
This study is in line with the research 
conducted by Skousen (2004) where the 
leverage does not affect the fraudulent financial 
reporting. The results of this study also support 
the results of the research conducted by Suyanto 
(2009) and Fira Fimanaya and Syafruddin 
(2014), in which the higher the loan, the greater 
the operational funds, and thus results in an 
increase in production and sales. In increase 
in production and sales will also increase 
the profits and the pressure for management 
is lowering. Finally, fraud is minimized. 
Associated with the public sector, the increased 
liability for the operational activities means 
that the funds are avelable for public services 
and the performance increases, so the pressure 
to commit fraud to be minimal.
The results of this study are not consistent 
with the research conducted by Luqi Santo 
Timor Andriana (2015) with the same research 
object, ie the district / municipal government, 
but in different sample year, ie local 
government financial statements (LKPD) 2012 
and 2013, where leverage has positive effect on 
fraudulent financial reporting. In those years 
the local governments were looking for other 
funding sources to support their operations. To 
maintain the leverage ratio at a reasonable level, 
the governments were experiencing pressure 
and commit fraudulent financial reporting by 
increasing the value of assets.
Budget absorption in fraudulent financial re-
porting (H1b)
Individual parameter significance test results 
in Table 7 show that β negative coefficient 
value is -0.078, wald value for the variable of 
budget absorption is 6.483 with a significance 
value of 0.011. The significance value less than 
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0.10 means that H1b is received. So it can 
be said that the variable of budget absorption 
(REALEXP) has negative effect on fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Budget expenditure absorption is a scourge 
for the district / municipal governments. The 
governments are required to absorb the budget 
as much as possible, because in Indonesia, 
government expenditure is a driving force 
of economic growth, in addition to public 
consumption, investment and net exports. 
Personnel expenditure, goods / services 
expenditure, and capital expenditures will have 
multiplier effects on the economy.
The pressure of budget expenditure 
absorption has encouraged the local 
governments to implement all activities that 
have been planned in the local budget, but in 
reality, this rarely occurs because of various 
constraints and resource limitations. One of 
the local governments’ efforts to raise budget 
expenditure realization is by performing 
expenditure overstatement, such as fictitious 
expenditure and / or overpayment. At present, 
overpayment is the most common case, and the 
case of fictitious expenditures has decreased. 
The district / municipal governments with low 
real expenditure tend to perform fraud. Thus, 
the budget absorption has negative effect on 
fraudulent financial reporting. The results 
support the results of the research conducted by 
Suyanto (2009), Fira Fimanaya and Syafruddin 
(2014) and Noval Dwi Aditya Nugraha and 
Henny (2015) that financial target has negative 
effect on fraudulent financial reporting.
The Factor of Opportunity in fraudulent finan-
cial reporting (H2)
Transactions of Special party (income trans-
fers from central government to local govern-
ments) in the fraudulent financial reporting) 
(H2a)
Individual parameter significance test results 
in Table 7 show that the β positive coefficient 
value is 1.217, wald value for the variable of 
related party transactions / income transfer 
(LNTRANS) is 4.535 with a significance value 
of 0.033. The significance value less than 0.10 
means that H2a is received. So, it can be said 
that the variable of related party transactions / 
income transfer has positive effect on fraudulent 
financial reporting.
The results support the results of the 
research conducted by Lou and Wang (2009), 
and Ema Kurniawati (2012) stating that related 
party transactions affect the fraudulent financial 
reporting. According to Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Neal (2010), the companies 
which are indicated to have committed 
fraud tend to perform more frequent / larger 
special party transaction. The presence of this 
transaction increases the risk of fraud.
Most district / municipal governments 
rely on income transfers from the central 
government because the local revenue is 
small. This dependence indirectly forces the 
district / municipal governments to manipulate 
their financial and operational performance 
reports so that the the amount of the income 
transfer received will not decrease but increase. 
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Providing unreal / fictitious report is part of 
fraud.
The results of this study are not in line with 
the results of the study conducted by Santo Luqi 
Timor Andriana (2015) that the income transfer 
does not have positive influence on fraudulent 
financial reporting, because almost all get the 
opportunity to receive income transfers. The 
opportunity is in fact not the same with regard 
to the nominal amount of the transfer. As there 
are formulations of determining the number of 
transfers, the income transfer received by the 
district / municipal government is different 
from one another, and the central government 
also implements reward and punishment for 
the use of transfer funds so that there could be 
addition or reduction of funds.
Internal control weakness in fraudulent 
financial reporting (H2b)
Individual parameter significance test 
results in Table 7 show that the value of the β 
negative coefficient value is 0,199, wald value 
for the variable of internal control weaknesses 
(ICWCASE) is 27.989 with a significance value 
of 0.000. The significance value less than 0.10 
means that H2b is received. So, it can be said 
that the variable of internal control weakness 
has significant positive influence on fraudulent 
financial reporting.
The results of this study are in line with 
the results of the study conducted by Bell and 
Carcello (2000), KPMG (2008), ACFE (2014) 
that conclude that one of the determining 
factors for the occurrence of fraud is a weak 
internal control environment. The results of this 
study are also consistent with the results of the 
study conducted by Aditya Pramudita (2013) 
and Rangga Nuh Apriadi and Fachriyah (2015) 
that the effectiveness of internal control system 
of employees in an agency can prevent the 
occurance of fraud in the government sector.
Internal control weaknesses are 
characterized by many findings in BPK’s Audit 
Results on the internal control system. The 
findings of the weaknesses of internal control 
system which contain material misstatements 
become an exception in qualified opinion on 
local government financial statements. Based 
on BPK’s Audit Reports Summary of the First 
Semester of 2015, the findings of the weaknesses 
of internal control system are broadly grouped 
into the weaknesses of accounting and reporting 
control systems, the weaknesses of budget 
(revenue and expenditure) implementation 
control system, and the weakness of the internal 
control structure. The weaknesses of internal 
control system are found almost in all local 
governments.
Factor of Rationalization (Non-Unqualified 
Opinion in the previous year) in fraudulent 
financial reporting (H3)
Individual parameter significance test 
results in Table 7 show that the wald value 
for the variable of Non-Unqualified Opinion 
in previous (PRIOROP) is 0.000 with a 
significance value of 0.995. The significance 
value is greater than 0.10, which means that H3 
is rejected. So, it can be said that the variable of 
Non-Unqualified Opinion in the previous year 
has no positive effect on fraudulent financial 
reporting.
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The results of this research are in line 
with the results of the research conducted 
by Fira Fimanaya and Syafruddin (2014) 
and Luqi Santo Timor Andriana (2015) that 
the previous year audit opinion has no affect 
fraudulent financial reporting. Cressey (1953) 
and Carcello and Hermanson (2008) state that 
interview with perpetrators of fraud is the best / 
ideal way to find a rationalization / justification 
for fraud.
Factor of capability (changes of regional 
heads) in fraudulent financial reporting (H4)
Individual parameter significance test 
results in Table 7 show that the β negatif 
coefficient value is -0.533, wald value for 
the variable of changes of regional head is 
2,801 with significance value of 0.094. The 
significance value less than 0.10 but the 
direction is negative means that H4 is rejected. 
So, it can be said that the variable of changes 
of regional head (CHKD) has no positive effect 
on fraudulent financial reporting.
The results of this research are in line 
with the research conducted by Kennedy 
Samuel Sihombing and Rahardjo (2014) that 
the capability has no positive influence on 
fraudulent Financial Reporting. According to 
Kennedy Samuel Sihombing and Rahardjo 
(2014), citing Wolfe and Hermanson (2009), 
it can happen if the top stakeholders want the 
performance improvement by recruiting the 
ranks of employees who are considered more 
competent than the previous directors. Changes 
of regional heads in 2013-2014 were generally 
due to expire term of office, not for alleged 
fraud. Regional head substitution is expected 
to improve the performance of governance 
and financial management. It is expected 
that the longer served the more increased the 
performance of the government because they 
already know the problem and the best solution.
Control variable (total assets) in fraudulent 
financial reporting
Individual parameter significance test results 
in Table 7 show that the βpositif coefficient 
value is -0.928, wald value for the variable of 
total assets is 4.336 with a significance value 
of 0.037. The significance value less than 0.10 
means the variable of total assets (LNASET) 
has negative effect on fraudulent financial 
reporting.
The greater the assets of a district / municipal 
government, the lower the possibility of 
performing fraudulent financial reporting. This 
occurs because the local governments which 
have great assets are the long standing local 
government, not as a result of expansion so that 
they have experience in managing the regional 
finances.
CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND 
SUGGESTION
From the results of this study, it can be 
concluded that the factor of pressure (financial 
targets proxied by the percentage of budget 
absorption) has negative effect on fraudulent 
financial reporting; the factor of opportunity 
(related party transactions proxied by income 
transfers from the central government and 
internal control weakness proxied by the 
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SPI findings LHP BPK) has positive effect 
on fraudulent financial reporting; the factor 
of capability proxied by the regional head 
substitution has positive effect on fraudulent 
financial reporting. Meanwhile, the factor of 
pressure (external pressure proxied by the ratio 
of local governments’ ability to meet liabilities 
(leverage) and the factor of rationalization 
proxied by Non-Unqualified Opinion in the 
previous year have no affect the fraudulent 
financial reporting.
The limitations of this research are that 
this research only uses secondary data from 
BPK’s Audit Reports and Semester Audit 
Report Summary in which for the factor 
of rationalization is less able to explain the 
relationship / influence on fraudulent financial 
reporting. Therefore, it requires additional 
data from the questionnaire. The use of only 
secondary data from a single source, BPK, 
limits the number / type of proxies that can be 
used to explain the variables.
Knowing the limitations of this study, it is 
suggested that: 1) future studies incorporate 
between the secondary data and the primary 
data obtained through questionnaires to 
enhance the research; 2) future studies extend 
the research sample in time series ie 5 years; 3) 
future studies use data from other sources such 
as the ministry of internal affairs, the ministry 
of finance, and the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS) to add a proxy so as to strengthen the 
explanation of variables; 4) this study can be 
used as input for the agency as well as the 
auditor in creating transparent and accountable 
state / regional financial management.
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